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1 Introduction 
 
The banking industry underwent a deep transformation process during the last two 
decades. On the asset side, the change in the nature of the financial intermediation 
business originated as a consequence of the intense competition in the sector. According 
to the Federal Reserve, the average Net Interest Margin (hereafter, NIM) of all U.S. 
banks reached a peak of 4.90% in the first quarter of 1993, declining progressively up to 
a minimum of 3.15% in late 2008. The average non-interest income to assets ratio over 
this period steadily grew, showing the basic reaction of banks to this market trend. 
Banks diversify a great proportion of their traditional business activity (mostly based on 
deposits and business lending) and engage in other income-generating practices. 
Deregulatory changes such as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in 1999 make it possible 
for U.S. Bank Holding Companies to generate new revenues in the form of fees, 
commissions, and direct income from trading, securitization, and other investment 
activities. Major trends on the liabilities side shift bank incentives to rely on short-term 
wholesale funding, rather than traditional bonds and core demand deposits. 
 
It may be thought that diversifying operations across different activities reduces risk, 
and that net income may be more stable. However, the extant research shows that non-
lending revenues increase the individual exposure to the market and contributes to 
increasing  the vulnerability of the financial system. Not only is non-lending banking 
activity a more volatile source of income (Stiroh and Rumble (2006); DeYoung and 
Roland (2001)), but it could also be a source of systemic risk to the sector 
(Brunnermeier et al. (2012)).  
 
Furthermore, if the non-interest activities are financed through an unstable source of 
funds, the higher the non-traditional activity, the higher the liquidity exposure. In fact, 
the excessive overreliance on unstable wholesale funding makes banks more vulnerable 
to liquidity shocks in money markets. This proved to be a major driver in amplifying 
and transmitting the idiosyncratic shocks initiated in the U.S. real estate sector to a 
global scale during the recent financial crisis, generating large externalities to the real 
economy.  
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An open question, therefore, concerns why bank managers enthusiastically engage in 
activities that may not be optimal from an individual risk-return perspective and, 
furthermore, increase the overall fragility of the financial system. While wholesale 
markets seem to provide an unlimited source of fast and cheap funding that banks use to 
expand their balance sheets, non-interest activities largely increase banking profitability, 
all together granting constant dividends and substantial bonus payments in the sector. A 
likely explanation is that bank managers may have imprudently over-relied on non-
interest income sources and whole-sale funding owing to personal objectives, leading 
their firms (and the whole sector) to an inappropriate level of risk-taking. In spite of the 
considerable attention this moral hazard problem attracts, the empirical relation between 
managerial compensation and abnormal risk-taking, sourced in income-generating 
activities and funding strategies, must still be formally analyzed.1 This is the main 
motivation for the current study. 
 
In this paper, we address whether cross-sectional differences in executive variable 
compensation in the U.S. banking industry in the period 1995-2010 can be empirically 
related to firm-specific drivers of individual and systemic importance in the sector. Our 
sample includes pre- and post-crisis periods, which allow us to distinguish the effects of 
the economic turmoil. More specifically, we analyze the relative importance of non-
traditional banking activities on the balance sheet, measured by the relative level of non-
interest income and its main components, such as trading activity, investment banking 
and venture capital revenues. We study the roles of different sources of bank funding in 
the leverage ratio, with  a special focus on short-term wholesale funding. These 
variables are largely related to individual market and liquidity risk exposures, 
respectively, and are major determinants of systemic risk in the financial industry. Our 
empirical analysis, conducted in a cross-sectional regression analysis with multi-way 
cluster on annual data from 163 banks, totals over 1,325 observations in a panel-data 
sample. 
 
                                                 
1 Before the financial crisis, large bonuses in the financial sector were often viewed as a sign of good 
financial health and profitability in the sector. During the crisis, profits declined and the largest U.S. 
banks collectively received billions in bail out money; however, they still had to pay a surprisingly large 
amount of bonuses to their top executives because of inappropriate links between earnings and 
compensation, which raised critical voices.  
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The main results from this analysis can be summarized as follows. First, we find that, 
after controlling for firm performance, growth opportunities, and other relevant firm-
specific and macroeconomic characteristics, a greater reliance on activities that generate 
non-interest income positively associates with a larger proportion of variable 
compensation. This is consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis and suggests bank 
managers may have consented to undertake pro-cyclical investments, increasing both 
the risk of the firm and the contribution to the system risk, expecting to achieve greater 
payment. We observe major differences across the different components of variable 
compensation in executive payments in relation to banks’ activities. While exercised 
options are more sensitive to income trading activities, bonuses tend to be related to the 
revenues originated in fees and commissions from investment banking activity and 
capital growth from venture capital investments.2 Similarly, a greater reliance on short-
term wholesale funding, mainly used to finance balance sheet expansion, positively 
associates with higher levels of variable compensation, which is consistent with the 
main predictions of the moral hazard hypothesis. This evidence suggests that fast-
growing firms are able to pay greater variable compensation, but at the cost of 
increasing the liquidity risk exposures of the firm and causing larger systemic 
externalities.  
 
There exists a vast literature in corporate finance and financial accounting related to 
incentive compensation in the context of asymmetric information, mainly framed in 
principal-agency theory; see, among others, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Mirrlees 
(1976, 1997), Holmström (1979) and Fama and Jensen (1983). According to this 
setting, compensation packages are mainly designed to align the objectives of managers 
with the central interest of shareholders (maximize the value of their stocks), attempting 
to minimize the agency costs arising from the separation between control and property.  
 
Because total executive compensation ties to stock value, and banks are 
characteristically highly leveraged institutions, bank managers are provided with 
                                                 
2 A possible rationale for this finding is that, while stock options tend to be exercised during upturn 
market conditions, bonus payments are related to the revenues originated in fees and commissions from 
investment banking activity, and capital growth from venture capital activities. Venture capital activities 
involve the providing of funds, whether in the form of loans or equity, and technical and management 
assistance, when needed and requested, to start-up high-risk companies specializing in new technologies, 
ideas, products, or processes. 
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powerful incentives to take imprudent risk, aiming to maximize their personal wealth 
(Hentschel and Smith (1997); Morgan (2002); Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010)). As 
Prendergast (2002) shows, a positive relationship exists between incentive 
compensation and risk. Several factors encourage risk-taking in this context, all of 
which stem from a moral hazard problem.3 
 
We build on the existing theoretical literature and seek to explain how variable pay 
changes with risk. In the canonical agency model, there is a negative trade-off between 
incentives and risk, as outlined in the benchmark model of Prendergast (1999). A risk 
neutral principal contracting with a risk averse agent will set a bonus equal to (1+rc σ2)-1. 
This long-standing result shows a negative relationship between risk (σ2) and incentives 
(b). However, as Prendergast (2002) documents, the empirical verdict on this negative 
relationship is far from conclusive, and in fact, the relationship may be positive. 
 
We adopt the Holmstrom-Milgrom (1991) multitasking framework to argue that 
external variations in the market place have driven both increases in systemic risk, as 
well as increases in variable compensation. Thus, in this sense, the systemic risk is 
endogenous and a function of other factors in the economy, such as the availability of 
wholesale funding and the productivity of non-interest activities (like proprietary 
trading). These secular changes in the technological landscape for banks have increased 
the productivity of non-interest activities. Consequently, managers have shifted their 
efforts into such activities. This raises variable pay, but also drives increases in systemic 
risk. Our simplified model provides the core theoretical guidance for our hypotheses.  
 
Under the moral hazard hypothesis, we expect a positive relationship between variable 
compensation and variables related to risk. The relative level of non-interest income 
reflects market risk exposures, with a large ratio being indicative of weakness in core 
business and over-reliance on risky activities (Stiroh (2004); Song and Thakor (2007)). 
Because of the declining profitability of core activities prior to the crisis, bank managers 
                                                 
3 Stocks can be seen as a call option on the total firm’s value, so bank managers have incentives to 
increase the level of underlying risk to increase the value of the option and, hence, the expected value of 
their accrued payments. Compensation arrangements include stock options, which enable executives to 
realize the upside benefits of risk taking, while limiting the down-side costs, thereby promoting risk-
taking. Additionally, compensation packages include bonus plans that reward short-term profitability 
without regard for the risk involved, which encourages risk-taking.  
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had incentives to engage in non-interest activities and increase their variable 
compensation, even at the cost of a greater risk exposure. In addition, there are further 
reasons to expect a positive relationship between variable compensation and non-
interest income. The relative degree of non-interest income is related to the degree of 
business complexity in the asset mix, and even to the degree of liquidity of the assets 
held by the organization; the literature on corporate finance reveals both characteristics 
as potential drivers of agency problems. As the firm grows in complexity, bank 
managers are more likely to use their discretionary ability in their own profit. In 
complex organizations, it is easier to conceal misaligned actions and deceive the 
organization’s internal control functions. Similarly, asset liquidity enables opportunities 
for bank managers to act on self-interest (Myers and Rajan (1998)) because they 
provide greater flexibility. Consequently, bank managers have incentives to choose 
liquid, non-traditional banking operations, such as trading income activities, to achieve 
personal objectives. At the same time, illiquid alternatives (e.g., venture capital 
investments) may be a less efficient vehicle for these purposes. Smith and Watts (1992) 
argue that the firm's asset mix influences the compensation policies.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory and 
hypothesis. Section 3 introduces the data and presents conventional descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 discusses the main empirical findings. Section 5 summarizes and 
concludes. An appendix collects the main sources of data used in the paper. 
 
2 Theory and Main Hypothesis 
 
To fix ideas, we propose a simple model of compensation and production based on the 
Holmstrom-Milgrom (1991) multitask model. Suppose a bank hires a manager to 
provide costly effort to run the bank. The bank cannot monitor the manager’s effort, and 
therefore there is a moral hazard problem. Instead, the effort stochastically increases 
output, which is the value of the firm represented by the stock price x. Since the bank 
cannot compensate on effort, it compensates on x.  
 
The manager has two types of effort. The first type, e1, is effort relating to lending. This 
includes finding new borrowers, screening quality, pricing loans, servicing loans, and 
managing credit risk. On the balance sheet, this effort shows up as interest income, as it 
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relates to all income generated from interest bearing activities such as lending. The 
other type of effort, e2, refers to all non-interest bearing activities. This includes 
investment banking, venture capital, proprietary trading, off-balance sheet financing, 
and many of the other activities made possible by the Financial Services Modernization 
Act of 1999, in which investment banks and commercial banks are allowed to merge. 
On the balance sheet, income from these activities is captured in the non-interest income 
account. Suppose the manager exerts effort ei at a private cost C(ei) = 0.5ciei2. There is 
an information problem in the firm, in that the manager knows ei but the bank does not. 
The cost of effort parameter ci tracks the elasticity of labor supply, as managers with 
lower parameter ci are able to supply more effort to the bank. The share price for the 
bank is given by: 
 
x = k1e1+ k2e2 + ε 
 
where ki is the marginal productivity of activity ei. For lending activities, k1 refers to all 
market or technological factors influencing the productivity of lending, such as the pool 
of borrowers attracted to the bank, the ability to accurately price the loan, productivity 
of servicing, and so on. For non-lending activities, k2 includes all market and 
technology factors that affect e2, such as information technology of computerized 
trading models for proprietary trading, laws and regulation around off-balance sheet 
financing, efficiency and productivity of asset-backed securitization, and so on. The 
noise term ԑ refers to residual uncertainty in the model. Let ԑ follow a symmetric 
distribution g with mean 0 and variance σ2. The value of the bank is reflected in its 
stock price x. 
 
The bank cannot observe effort so it instead offers a contract (s, b) contingent on the 
stock price x. The manager’s wage is therefore: 
 
w = s + bx 
 
where s is his salary and b is his bonus.  
 
Observe that his salary is his fixed compensation, whereas his bonus determines his 
variable compensation. This contract is linear in output, which is without loss of 
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generality since the manager is risk neutral. The timing of the game is as follows: the 
bank offers a contract (s,b); the manager accepts or rejects the contract; if he accepts the 
contract, he exerts costly effort ei; Nature reveals uncertainty ε; the share price x is 
formed; and the bank pays the manager w = s+bx.  
 
The manager will select effort to maximize his compensation net of his cost of effort. 
The manager does not know the realization of x at the time of his effort choice, and 
therefore he chooses ei to maximize his expected payoffs:  
 
Ew – C(e1) – C(e2) 
 
The first order conditions from the manager’s problem yields his incentive constraint:  
 
    ei = bki/ci 
 
Observe that equilibrium effort ei* increases in his bonus b and his marginal 
productivity ki, and decreases in his cost of effort ci. As the bank increases the bonus, 
this increases the manager’s incentive to provide effort, and similarly with increases in 
his marginal productivity of effort ki. The variable compensation paid to the manager is 
a total variable compensation relative to his total compensation. This is given by: 
 
V = bEx/(s+bEx) 
 
Some straightforward algebra shows that V is increasing in ki. Intuitively, increasing the 
marginal productivity of effort raises the manager’s variable pay, and therefore also his 
variable pay relative to his total pay (since ki does not affect the fixed component s). 
This comparative static will drive our empirical hypothesis. Changes in ki will drive 
changes in variable compensation V.  
 
Figure 1 shows the decrease of US Banks’ NIM from 1994. López-Espinosa et al. 
(2011) show a common pattern for developed countries, with a significant decrease of 
NIMs before the financial crisis. Given this significant decrease of NIM, bank managers 
engage in non-interest activities, allowed by the repeal of provisions in the Glass–
Steagall Act by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act in 1999, in order to obtain certain levels 
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of earnings, thus generating high levels of dividends and compensation. Consequently, 
our first hypothesis follows. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
 
Hypothesis 1 Everything else equal, variable compensation positively relates to the 
relative level of non-interest income. 
 
The relative level of non-interest income is a proxy for the productivity of non-interest 
activities ki. We interpret Figure 1 as a secular decline in the productivity of lending 
activities from 1994 (therefore a fall in k1), and a parallel rise in the productivity of non-
lending income (a rise in k2). Given these changes in ki, the manager will choose his 
effort in response according to his incentive constraint. Our conjecture is that the rise in 
k2 exceeds the fall in k1, and therefore the net effect is to increase variable 
compensation, leading to Hypothesis 1.  
 
Regarding the funding strategies, we can generally expect a positive relationship 
between variable compensation and the relative leverage of the bank, under the moral 
hazard hypothesis. While large debt holdings give rise to greater credit risk, the short-
term wholesale funding ratio proves a major determinant of liquidity risk in the firm 
(López-Espinosa et al. (2012)). Liquidity refers to the possibility of the bank failing to 
obtain funding to attend short-term payments and exposes the firm to default on the 
costs involved. A large short-term wholesale ratio not only implies a greater dependence 
of unstable funding and vulnerability to a market liquidity crunch, but also implies a 
greater maturity mismatch. Furthermore, it increases the counterparty risk in the system 
and the possibility of fire sales, thereby affecting systemic risk. Our second testable 
hypothesis follows. 
 
Hypothesis 2 Everything else equal, variable compensation positively relates to the 
level of short-term wholesale funding. 
 
The level of short-term wholesale funding affects the efficiency of the manager’s 
actions ei, and in particular e2. The banks dramatically increased their use of wholesale 
funding in order to provide a cheap and reliable source for their liabilities. This 
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wholesale funding, such as commercial paper, repos, and other short-term instruments, 
made it very easy for banks to fund their liabilities, and therefore fund the operations of 
the bank, both interest and non-interest activities. These activities especially supported 
much of the securitization machine for asset such as mortgages, which drove most of 
the profits of the broker-dealers since 1994. Thus, we interpret this increase in 
wholesale funding to reflect increases in the productivity of managerial effort, k2, as our 
main comparative statistics show that as k2 rises, so does variable compensation, V.  
 
Both non-interest income and short-term wholesale funding are major drivers of 
systemic risk in the banking industry. For instance, López-Espinosa et al. (2012) show 
short-term wholesale funding as the main driver of systemic risk in a sample of 
international and large-scale banks, in which size and leverage do not play major roles 
after accounting for this variable. Similarly, Brunnermeier et al. (2012) show the 
relationship between non-interest activities and systemic risk. This consideration is 
important because, consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis, managerial stock 
holdings and/or greater use of stock options are more likely to be used in institutions 
deemed “too big to fail” by regulators, as discussed by Houston and James (1995). 
 
3 Data and methodology 
 
The data used in this paper are obtained from different sources for the period 1995 to 
20104. We gathered quarterly accounting data for U.S. Bank Holding Companies 
(BHCs) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Regulatory Database, which 
contains accounting data from the required regulatory forms filed for supervising 
purposes by regulated depository financial institutions. We collect balance sheet and 
income statement data for all listed BHCs in the database. In addition, we use market 
data from the CRSP database and macro data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis FRED database. The Appendix provides a list of the specific variables we use, 
which we describe below, and the database codes.  
 
                                                 
4 Capital ratios are available from 1996Q1, so analyses with regulatory capital data are done on a slightly 
smaller sample. The results using Tier I as a control variable remain the same and are available upon 
request. 
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Our first hypothesis posits that, before the crisis, bank managers engaged in non-interest 
activities to increase their variable compensation, given the decrease of NIM of U.S. 
banks from 1994: if bank managers follow this strategy systematically we should 
observe a positive relationship between the variable compensation of bank managers 
and the non-interest income to net interest income ratio, after controlling for other 
potential drivers. 
 
Our second hypothesis postulates that, before the crisis, bank managers used short-term 
wholesale funding to expand bank balance sheets to obtain higher compensation. 
Therefore, we should observe a positive relationship between the variable compensation 
of bank managers and the proportion of short-term wholesale funding. 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, the firm-specific sensitivity of these compensation 
arrangement structures should be taken into account. Smith and Watts (1992) raise the 
so-called contracting hypothesis, arguing that compensation packages reflect differences 
in the firm's investment opportunity and the nature of a firm's assets. Other factors, such 
as the effect of size, share performance, firm performance, monitoring manager costs, 
manager discretion, or regulatory environment, are also key determinants of the 
structure of compensation in practice; see John and John (1993); Houston and James 
(1995); John, Saunders and Senbet (2000); Prendergast (2002); among others. We 
control for a number of bank-specific variables, such as the level of profitability, the 
credit exposure, the investment and growth opportunities, the size, the annual return of 
the bank, and a macroeconomic variable, the federal funds rate, to control for the cost of 
funds in the banking system.  
 
Our baseline model to test these hypotheses follows: 
                        
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8                      
it it it it it it
it it t it
VARCOMP TNIINII DTA NITA OBSEXPTA BTM
SIZE RET FFR u
     
  
     
          (1) 
 
where itu is an error term, itVARCOMP  is the variable compensation for all Board 
members of bank i at year t, computed as the difference between total compensation 
(including salary and other annual payments, bonuses, restricted stock grants, value of 
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options exercised, LTIP payouts and any other compensation) and salary. We focus on 
variable compensation instead of individual components of the compensation packages, 
since significant temporary differences among banks exist. Also, Kole (1993) shows 
that focusing on individual components of the compensation package elicits misleading 
inferences concerning the overall relationship between pay and performance. 
 
The description of the independent variables is as follows: 
 
- itTNIINII is the total non-interest income to net interest income ratio, accounting for the 
level of non-traditional activities of the bank i at year t. 
-DTAit: Total debt to total assets ratio of bank i at year t. Total debt is computed as the 
difference between total assets and equity and captures a firm’s leverage.  
-NITAit is the net income to total assets ratio (ROA), a control for the level of 
profitability of the bank i at year t. 
-OBSEXPTAit is the off-balance sheet exposure to total assets ratio of bank i at year t. It 
accounts for the level of current credit exposure across all off-balance sheet derivative 
contracts. 
-BTMit is the book-to-market ratio of bank i at year t, a usual control variable that 
captures growth opportunities of the bank. 
-SIZEit is the logarithm of the market value of bank i at year t. 
-RETit is the annual return of bank i at year t, controlling for the financial performance 
of the bank. 
-FFRt is the effective federal funds rate at year t, computed as an annual average; this 
proxies the cost of funds. 
 
The coefficient related to the TNIINIIit variable allows us to test the first hypothesis. In 
order to test the second hypothesis, we decompose the DTAit variable into the sum of 
DWWSFTAit (total debt excluding short-term wholesale funding to total assets) and 
WSFTAit (short-term wholesale funding to total assets) ratios. The former is a proxy for 
stable funding, while the latter is a proxy for interconnectivity among financial 
institutions and exposures to liquidity risk, a variable strongly related to systemic risk. 
This provides our second model to be tested: 
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1 2 3it it it it it itVARCOMP TNIINII DWWSFTA WSFTA Controls u                     (2) 
 
The total non-interest income to net interest income ratio (TNIINIIit variable), which 
accounts for the level of non-traditional activities of the bank, decomposes into the sum 
of TINIIit, the trading income to net interest income ratio, a measure of the trading 
activity of the bank, and IBVCNIIit, the investment banking advisory/ brokerage 
underwriting fees and commissions5 and venture capital revenue6 to net interest income 
ratio, accounting for the level of investment banking and venture capital activities of the 
bank. In order to check the importance of these two main components of total non-
interest income on variable compensation, we estimate a third model, which follows: 
 
1 2 3 4it it it it it itVARCOMP TNIINII TINII IBVCNII DTA Controls u               (3) 
 
Finally, we consider a fourth model, in which we decompose both the total non-interest 
income and the total debt into the components mentioned. In this way, we could test 
whether the assets side of the balance sheet drives the effect, whether this results from 
the liabilities side, or whether such results from a combination of both effects. Thus, the 
four models are as follows: 
 
1 2 3 3
4                          
it it it it
it it it
VARCOMP TNIINII TINII IBVCNII DWWSFTA
WSFTA Controls u
    
 
     
                    (4) 
 
The four models are estimated using two additional dependent variables, which 
represent two components of variable compensation. This structure enables us to gain 
more insight and, because there could be a different effect of the two main variables of 
interest, helps us consider whether compensation is equity-based or not. The first 
dependent variable, BONUSit, represents the total amount of bonus received over total 
compensation for all Board members of bank i at year t. The second variable, 
                                                 
5 Available in Bank Regulatory database until 2006. 
6 In general, venture capital activities involve the provision of funds, whether in the form of loans or 
equity, and technical and management assistance, when needed and requested, to start-up or high-risk 
companies specializing in new technologies, ideas, products, or processes. The primary objective of these 
investments is capital growth. This variable includes as venture capital revenue market value adjustments: 
interest, dividends, gains, and losses (including impairment losses) on venture capital investments (loans 
and securities). It also includes the bank's proportionate share of the income or loss before extraordinary 
items and other adjustments from its investments in equity method investees who are principally engaged 
in venture capital activities. 
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OPTIONSEXit, represents the value realized on options exercised over total 
compensation for all Board members of bank i at year t. Additionally, in order to 
analyze effects the financial crisis has on the hypotheses proposed, we run the 
regressions again, but include the interaction of a financial crisis dummy variable with 
our variables of interest. This dummy, CDt, takes value 1 if the year is equal to or 
superior than 2007. 
 
All equations are estimated through pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions with 
two-way cluster-robust standard errors, accounting for bank and time periods as clusters 
(Petersen (2009); Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor (2010); Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 
(2011); Thompson (2011)). The distinctive characteristic of multi-way clustered errors 
in the pooled regression setting allows us to carry out statistical inference, which is 
robust by design to simultaneous dependences of unknown form in both the cross-
sectional and time-series dimensions of the panel. Regression errors are assumed to be 
independent, but not identically distributed across a number of clusters and can have 
fairly general patterns of within-cluster correlation and heteroskedasticity. Results from 
alternative panel data methods lead to similar qualitative conclusions and are available 
upon request. 
 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics regarding variable compensation of bank 
managers. During the total period, variable components represent a high proportion of 
total compensation, with a mean figure of around 63.2 percent. Bonus compensation 
represents a 28.64 percent over-variable compensation, while options exercised account 
to a 31.96 percent over-variable compensation. Before the crisis period (defined here up 
through the year 2006), all figures relating to variable compensation, bonus and options 
exercised, are higher, representing mean values of 66.5, 22.4 and 23.0 percent over total 
compensation, respectively; however, after the crisis period, these three figures decrease 
up to 52.8, 4.4 and 11.4 percent, respectively, over total compensation. This means that 
before the crisis, the proportion of bonus over variable compensation (33.68 percent) 
proved similar to that of options exercised (34.59 percent). However, during the crisis 
period, the percentage of bonus and options exercised over variable compensation 
decreased up to an 8.33 and a 21.71 percent, respectively. That is, the relative 
importance of bonus was much smaller than that of options exercised. 
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[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
Table 2 shows the same descriptive statistics but for the independent variables in the 
analysis. Our first variable of interest, total non-interest income, represents a high 
proportion over net interest income (74.3 percent), showing how banks increasingly 
change the nature of their business, due to a decreasing profitability of the core 
business. Trading income, investment banking, and venture capital income represent, 
respectively, a 7.7 and a 7.1 percent over net interest income. Our second variable of 
interest, wholesale funding, represents 11.6 percent over total assets, and 12.75 percent 
over total debt. Net income over total assets reaches a mean value of 1 percent during 
the whole period. Off-balance sheet exposure accounts for 0.6 percent over total assets, 
which does not seem to be a high figure. The mean book-to-market ratio is 0.619, while 
the mean size of banks, in logarithm terms, is 14.834. The annual mean return is around 
15 percent, while the mean annual federal funds rate is around 3.60 percent.  
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
Table 3 shows the correlations between the variables in the analysis. The two variables 
of interest, total non-interest income over net interest income and wholesale funding, 
positively correlate with the variables considering compensation. This lines up with the 
hypotheses proposed, but the empirical analyses will show whether these relationships 
are significant or not. 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
4 Results 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of the four models for variable 
compensation. As expected, TNIINII positively relates to variable compensation, so that 
the diversification of activities entails higher compensation to managers, albeit the risk 
derived from the higher instability of non-interest income increase. This provides 
evidence for Hypothesis 1. When decomposing total non-interest income into the two 
components in Models III and IV, the results show the similar impact magnitude of 
IBVCNII on compensation to that of TNIINII. However, the impact of TINII is almost 
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six times higher than that of the other two variables. Thus, managers obtain more 
compensation through activities related to trading income than through any other 
component of non-interest income.7 Regarding Hypothesis 2, wholesale funding shows 
a positive impact on variable compensation, providing evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis. In fact, all variables relating to leverage show a positive impact on variable 
compensation. In this way, it seems bank managers may have been increasing the 
exposure to systemic risk to achieve higher variable compensation. Regarding the 
control variables, only SIZE and NITA show a significant impact on variable 
compensation, being that their coefficients are positive, so that as size and the level of 
profitability increase, variable compensation also increases.  
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
Table 5 includes the results of the models when considering the effect of the financial 
crisis. The effect of TNIINII on variable compensation before the crisis is rather similar 
to that of the whole period. However, during the crisis, only in one of the two models 
where this variable is included is the coefficient positive and significant at 5 percent. 
Before the crisis, both TINII and IBVCNII have a similar impacts on variable 
compensation to during the whole period. During the crisis, the variable compensation 
increases, due to income derived from trading activities, since revenues from investment 
banking and venture capital activities do not have an impact on variable compensation. 
The effect of wholesale funding before the financial crisis is similar to during the whole 
period, but during the crisis, increases in wholesale funding do not have a significant 
impact on variable compensation of bank managers. The same result applies when 
considering the total debt or the total debt without wholesale funding.  
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
                                                 
7 It should be taken into account that TINII and IBVCNII represent only around a 19.92 percent of 
TNIINII (see Table 2). Thus, one may argue that the remaining components of TNIINII could also be 
important drivers of variable compensation. We have run all the regressions again including a third 
variable that accounts for the remaining components of TNIINII. The results show that this variable is not 
significant and the impact of TINII and IBVCNII remain unaltered, so results are robust to this 
consideration. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) show that the remaining components of TNIINII do not have an 
impact on systemic risk, and we add to the literature by showing that these components also do not have 
an impact on bank manager’s compensation. 
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The estimations regarding bank managers’ bonuses are shown in Tables 6 and 7. Total 
non-interest income continues to have a positive and significant impact, so bank 
managers receive more bonuses related to these activities. Interestingly, only the 
activities derived from investment banking and venture capital have a positive and 
significant impact on bonuses received, since trading income is not significant. 
Increases in wholesale funding (as well as in total leverage or total leverage without 
wholesale funding) increase the bonuses bank managers receive. Regarding the control 
variables, we find that as profitability, off-balance sheet exposures, and the annual 
return increase, so do the bonuses received. The result regarding returns is also found in 
Livne, Markarian and Milne (2011), who show cash bonuses are positively related to 
returns.  
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
If we analyze the results distinguishing the effects between and during the financial 
crisis, Table 7 provides more insights. During the crisis, bonuses increase considerably 
with the activities related to investment banking and venture capital. Regarding the 
evidence of the variables related to debt, the evidence is similar to that of total variable 
compensation. During the crisis, increases in any of the three variables lead to lower 
bonuses.  
 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
 
Table 8 shows the result regarding the estimations for options exercised. For this 
component of compensation, only the variable related to trading income is significant. 
This extends the results of Brewer, Hunter and Jackson (2004), who show that non- 
traditional, non-interest income positively relates to equity based compensation. We 
find only a component of total non-interest income drives this result. As opposed to 
bonus compensation, in which investment banking and venture capital activities are the 
drivers, in the case of options exercised, we find trading income raises this type of 
compensation. A possible rationale for this finding is that while stock options tend to be 
exercised during upturn market conditions, bonus payments relate more to the revenues 
originated in fees and commissions from investment banking activity and capital growth 
from venture capital activities. Venture capital activities involve providing funds, 
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whether in the form of loans or equity, and technical and management assistance, when 
needed and requested to start-up high-risk companies specializing in new technologies, 
ideas, products, or processes. Regarding the results related to debt, we find debt leads to 
increases in options exercised. Wholesale funding is significant in just one of the two 
models in which it is included, and the magnitude of the impact is smaller than the one 
found in variable compensation and bonuses. Only three of the control variables turn 
out to be significant in this case: size, net income, and off-balance sheet exposure. 
 
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
 
Table 9 shows the results for options exercised and distinguishes the periods before and 
during the financial crisis. Before the financial crisis, the results are rather similar to 
those for the whole period. During the financial crisis, we find trading income is no 
longer significant, so it does not lead to increases in options exercised. Regarding the 
variables related to debt, debt without wholesale funding is the only one that is 
significant with a negative coefficient, implying that increases in debt (except that of 
wholesale funding) reduce the options exercised by bank managers. 
 
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
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5 Conclusions 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, and after Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, banks 
increasingly engaged in activities that increased the bank’s exposure to risk and even 
led to increases in systemic risk. A clear example of these activities is that banks have 
increasingly earned a higher proportion of their earnings from non-interest income 
activities. They have also expanded their balance sheets through short-term wholesale 
funding, which provides a source of fast and cheap funding. Bearing this in mind, the aim 
of this paper is to analyze whether bank managers could have imprudently over-relied 
on non-interest income sources and wholesale funding in order to increase their variable 
compensation. In order to test these two hypotheses, the sample is based on U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies, with annual data from 1995 to 2010.  
 
The main results from this analysis can be summarized as follows. First, we find that 
after controlling for firm performance, growth opportunities and other relevant firm-
specific and macroeconomic characteristics, a greater reliance on activities that generate 
non-interest income positively associates to a larger proportion of variable 
compensation. This is consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis and suggests bank 
managers consented to undertake pro-cyclical investments that increase both the risk of 
the firm and the contribution to the system risk, expecting to achieve greater variable 
payments. We observe major differences across the different components of variable 
compensation in executive payments in relation to banks’ activities. While exercised 
options are more sensitive to income trading activities, bonuses are related to the 
revenues originated in fees and commissions from investment banking activity and 
capital growth from venture capital investments. Similarly, a greater reliance on short-
term wholesale funding, mainly used to finance balance sheet expansions, positively 
associates with higher levels of variable compensation, consistent with the main 
predictions of the moral hazard hypothesis. This evidence suggests fast-growing firms 
are able to pay greater variable compensation, yet at the cost of increasing the liquidity 
risk exposures of the bank and causing larger systemic externalities.  
 
This analysis is particularly relevant for regulatory considerations. As recently as June 
2010, the Federal Reserve, in cooperation with other federal agencies, issued a final 
guidance designed to help ensure that incentive compensation arrangements in the 
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banking industry do not encourage imprudent risk taking. Among the different 
proposals included, it encourages risk-adjusted compensation arrangements, which, to 
be fully effective, “…should take account of the full range of risks, including credit, 
market, liquidity, operational, legal, compliance, and reputational risks.” Our paper 
provides formal support to these claims, showing that different sources of individual 
uncertainty, mainly related to market, operational and liquidity risks, are empirically 
related to variable compensation. In addition, international regulators require capital 
surcharges to so-called Systemically Important Financial Institutions aiming to prevent, 
or at least mitigate, episodes of financial contagion. According to our analysis, major 
drivers of systemic importance relate to variable compensation payments. International 
regulators may reinforce local initiatives to control compensation practices.  
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Appendix: Accounting, Compensation, Market and Macro Data. 
Accounting, executive compensation, and market data come from Bank Regulatory (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago), Standard&Poor’s Execucomp and CRSP database respectively. 
Variables Database Codes 
Equity Bank Regulatory BHCK3210  
Net Income  Bank Regulatory BHCK4340 
Net Interest Income  Bank Regulatory BHCK4074 
Total Assets  Bank Regulatory BHCK2170 
Total Non-interest Income  Bank Regulatory BHCK4079 
Trading Income  Bank Regulatory 
BHCKA220+BHCKB493+ 
BHCK8560+BHCK8561 
Investment banking advisory/ 
brokerage underwriting fees and 
commissions and venture capital 
revenue  
 
Bank Regulatory 
BHCKB490 (until 2006) 
+BHCKB491 
Off-balance sheet exposure  Bank Regulatory BHCK8764 
Short-term wholesale funding   Bank Regulatory 
BHCK2309+ BHCK3353+ 
BHCK2332+ BHDMA243 
Bonus Standard&Poor’s Execucomp BONUS 
Options exercised Standard&Poor’s Execucomp OPT_EXER_VAL 
Salary Standard&Poor’s Execucomp SALARY 
Total compensation Standard&Poor’s Execucomp TDC2 
Stock Price CRSP Prc 
Cumulative factor to adjust prices CRSP Cfacpr 
Cumulative factor to adjust shares/vol CRSP Cfacshr 
Shares outstanding CRSP Shrout 
Return with dividends CRSP Ret 
Market capitalization CRSP (prc/cfacpr)*(shrout*cfacshr) 
Effective federal funds rate Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis   
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 Figures 
 
Figure 1. Net Interest Margin of U.S. Banks. 
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          Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of compensation 
Variable #Obs. Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev. 
Total Period       
VARCOMP 1,325 0.632 0.490 0.655 0.808 0.213 
Bonus 1,325 0.181 0.034 0.171 0.277 0.155 
Options exercised 1,289 0.202 0.014 0.138 0.311 0.215 
Pre-crisis period       
VARCOMP 1,007 0.665 0.531 0.690 0.821 0.193 
Bonus 1,007 0.224 0.116 0.212 0.314 0.147 
Options exercised 971 0.230 0.046 0.182 0.352 0.216 
Post-crisis period       
VARCOMP 318 0.528 0.351 0.533 0.717 0.240 
Bonus 318 0.044 0 0 0.047 0.085 
Options exercised 318 0.114 0 0.019 0.156 0.188 
Descriptive statistics of the following variables: VARCOMP: variable compensation over total 
compensation; Bonus: total amount of bonus received over total compensation; Options exercised: value 
realized on options exercised over total compensation. All variables are measured in annual terms. 
Compensation refers to the total amount for all Board members. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Variable #Obs. Mean 25% Median 75% Std. Dev. 
Bank variables       
TNIINII 1,325 0.743 0.294 0.456 0.719 1.226 
TINII 1,325 0.077 0.004 0.020 0.053 0.221 
IBVCINII 1,325 0.071 0 0 0.012 0.896 
DTA 1,325 0.910 0.899 0.913 0.925 0.028 
DWWSFTA 1,325 0.794 0.757 0.803 0.846 0.078 
WSFTA 1,325 0.116 0.059 0.103 0.156 0.080 
NITA 1,325 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.009 
OBSEXPTA 1,325 0.006 1.52E-6 0.001 0.004 0.020 
BTM 1,325 0.619 0.374 0.488 0.652 0.531 
SIZE 1,325 14.834 13.713 14.592 15.869 1.528 
RET 1,325 0.150 -0.065 0.129 0.355 0.355 
Macroeconomic variable       
FFR 1,325 0.036 1.670 4.960 5.350 2.044 
Descriptive statistics of the following variables: TNIINII: total non-interest income over net interest 
income; TINII: trading income over net interest income; IBVCINII: investment banking and venture 
capital income over net interest income; DTA: total debt deflated by bank’s total assets; DWWSFTA: 
total debt without short-term wholesale funding deflated by total assets; WSFTA: short-term wholesale 
funding over total assets; NITA: net income to total assets; OBSEXPTA: off-balance sheet exposure to 
total assets; BTM: book-to-market; SIZE: logarithm of bank’s market value; RET: annual bank’s return; 
FFR: federal funds rate. All variables are measured in annual terms. 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 1.00              
2 0.21 1.00             
3 0.50 -0.10 1.00            
4 0.24 0.11 0.02 1.00           
5 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.35 1.00          
6 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.80 0.03 1.00         
7 0.10 0.23 0.07 -0.37 -0.02 -0.56 1.00        
8 0.31 0.07 -0.00 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.05 1.00       
9 0.20 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.26 -0.06 0.27 0.16 1.00      
10 0.31 0.23 0.29 0.22 0.17 0.18 -0.17 -0.04 -0.05 1.00     
11 0.30 0.21 -0.02 0.26 0.39 0.02 0.17 0.45 0.34 -0.07 1.00    
12 -0.28 -0.27 -0.28 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.16 0.10 -0.04 -0.74 0.04 1.00   
13 0.64 0.18 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.08 -0.03 0.56 0.26 0.27 0.41 -0.22 1.00  
14 0.13 0.29 0.12 -0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.10 -0.07 -0.04 0.35 -0.02 -0.45 0.05 1.00 
15 0.10 0.17 0.10 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.20 -0.10 0.08 0.28 0.01 -0.33 0.04 0.21 
Correlations among the variables included in the empirical analysis. (1) Variable compensation over total 
compensation; (2) Bonus: total amount of bonus received over total compensation; (3) Options exercised: 
value realized on options exercised over total compensation; (4) TNIINII: total non-interest income over 
net interest income; (5) TINII: trading income over net interest income; (6) IBVCINII: investment 
banking and venture capital income over net interest income; (7) DTA: total debt deflated by bank’s total 
assets; (8) DWWSFTA: total debt without short-term wholesale funding over total assets; (9) WSFTA: 
short-term wholesale funding over total assets; (10) NITA: net income to total assets; (11) OBSEXPTA: 
off-balance sheet exposure to total assets; (12) BTM: book-to-market; (13) SIZE: logarithm of bank’s 
market value; (14) RET: annual bank’s return; (15) FFR: federal fund rate. All variables are measured in 
annual terms. Compensation refers to the total amount for all Board members.  
Values in bold are significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Table 4. Estimation of variable compensation 
Variable M. I M. II M. III M. IV 
Constantit -1.756 
(0.00) 
-1.786 
(0.00) 
-1.795 
(0.00) 
-1.842 
(0.00) 
TNIINIIit 0.017 
(0.00) 
0.018 
(0.00)   
TINIIit   0.094 (0.00) 
0.098 
(0.00) 
IBVCNIIit   0.016 (0.03) 
0.017 
(0.02) 
DTAit 1.300 
(0.00)  
1.326 
(0.00)  
DWWSFTAit  1.331 (0.00)  
1.375 
(0.00) 
WSFTAit  1.294 (0.00)  
1.317 
(0.00) 
NITAit 3.476 
(0.01) 
3.454 
(0.01) 
3.179 
(0.01) 
3.132 
(0.01) 
OBSEXPTAit  0.351 
(0.16) 
0.378 
(0.16) 
0.154 
(0.61) 
0.188 
(0.55) 
BTMit -0.001 
(0.96) 
-0.001 
(0.96) 
-0.002 
(0.94) 
-0.002 
(0.94) 
SIZEit 0.078 
(0.00) 
0.078 
(0.00) 
0.079 
(0.00) 
0.080 
(0.00) 
RETit 0.018 
(0.52) 
0.018 
(0.54) 
0.019 
(0.50) 
0.018 
(0.53) 
FFRt -1.2E-4 
(0.98) 
-4E-5 
(0.99) 
5.3E-4 
(0.93) 
6.7E-4 
(0.91) 
     
R2 adjusted 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
Number observations 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 
Pooled regression time-series with robust errors computed on double cluster (bank and year). Dependent 
variable VARCOMPit: variable compensation over total compensation (for all Board members). TNIINIIit: 
total non-interest income over net interest income; TINII: trading income over net interest income; 
IBVCINII: investment banking and venture capital income over net interest income; DTAit: total debt 
deflated by bank’s total assets; DWWSFTAit: total debt without short-term wholesale funding over total 
assets; WSFTAit: short-term wholesale funding over total assets; NITAit: net income to total assets; 
OBSEXPTAit: off-balance sheet exposure to total assets; BTMit: book-to-market; SIZEit: logarithm of 
bank’s market value; RETit: annual bank’s return; FFRt: federal fund rate. All variables are measured in 
annual terms. Robust p-values in brackets. 
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Table 5. Estimation of variable compensation distinguishing the crisis period 
Variable M. I M. II M. III M. IV 
Constantit -1.516 
(0.00) 
-1.745 
(0.00) 
-1.572 
(0.00) 
-1.762 
(0.00) 
TNIINIIit 0.014 
(0.01) 
0.017 
(0.00)   
CDt*TNIINIIit 0.029 
(0.14) 
0.553 
(0.04)   
TINIIit   0.077 (0.00) 
0.085 
(0.00) 
CDt*TINIIit   0.160 (0.00) 
0.175 
(0.01) 
IBVCNIIit   0.013 (0.04) 
0.016 
(0.02) 
CDt*IBVCNIIit   0.515 (0.07) 
0.382 
(0.23) 
DTAit 1.090 
(0.00)  
1.129 
(0.00)  
CDt*DTAit -0.077 
(0.09)  
-0.062 
(0.06)  
DWWSFTAit  1.316 (0.00)  
1.299 
(0.00) 
CDt*DWWSFTAit  -0.674 (0.04)  
-0.002 
(0.22) 
WSFTAit  1.287 (0.00)  
1.269 
(0.00) 
CDt*WSFTAit  -0.382 (0.06)  
-0.171 
(0.20) 
NITAit 3.038 
(0.01) 
3.402 
(0.00) 
2.777 
(0.01) 
2.958 
(0.01) 
OBSEXPTAit  0.408 
(0.07) 
0.354 
(0.19) 
0.227 
(0.40) 
0.208 
(0.48) 
BTMit 0.007 
(0.79) 
0.006 
(0.82) 
0.007 
(0.79) 
0.003 
(0.91) 
SIZEit 0.076 
(0.00) 
0.077 
(0.00) 
0.078 
(0.00) 
0.080 
(0.00) 
RETit 0.007 
(0.80) 
0.010 
(0.73) 
0.008 
(0.77) 
0.012 
(0.69) 
FFRt -0.003 
(0.62) 
-0.002 
(0.76) 
-0.002 
(0.68) 
-4E-4 
(0.94) 
     
R2 adjusted 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.46 
Number observations 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 
Pooled regression time-series with robust errors computed on double cluster (bank and year). Dependent 
variable VARCOMPit: variable compensation over total compensation (for all Board members). TNIINIIit: 
total non-interest income over net interest income; CDt: crisis dummy variable (1 if year equal or superior 
than 2007); CDt*TNIINIIit: interaction between CD and TNIINII; TINIIit: trading income over net interest 
income; CDt*TINIIit: interaction between CD and TINII; IBVCINIIit: investment banking and venture 
capital income over net interest income; CDt*IBVCINIIit: interaction between CD and IBVCINII; DTAit: 
total debt deflated by bank’s total assets; CDt*DTAit: interaction between CD and DTA; DWWSFTAit: 
total debt without short-term wholesale funding over total assets; CDt*DWWSFTAit: interaction between 
CD and DWWSFTA; WSFTAit: short-term wholesale funding over total assets; CDt*WSFTAit: interaction 
between CD and WSFTA; NITAit: net income to total assets; OBSEXPTAit: off-balance sheet exposure to 
total assets; BTMit: book-to-market; SIZEit: logarithm of bank’s market value; RETit: annual bank’s return; 
FFRt: federal fund rate. All variables are measured in annual terms. Robust p-values in brackets. 
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Table 6. Estimation of bonus 
Variable M. I M. II M. III M. IV 
Constantit -1.313 
(0.00) 
-1.282 
(0.00) 
-1.686 
(0.00) 
-1.654 
(0.00) 
TNIINIIit 0.016 
(0.03) 
0.016 
(0.04)   
TINIIit   0.016 (0.57) 
0.014 
(0.64) 
IBVCNIIit   0.034 (0.00) 
0.033 
(0.00) 
DTAit 1.492 
(0.00)  
1.876 
(0.00)  
DWWSFTAit  1.459 (0.00)  
1.842 
(0.00) 
WSFTAit  1.498 (0.00)  
1.882 
(0.00) 
NITAit 3.099 
(0.01) 
3.122 
(0.00) 
3.280 
(0.01) 
3.312 
(0.01) 
OBSEXPTAit  1.026 
(0.07) 
0.998 
(0.08) 
1.045 
(0.05) 
1.022 
(0.05) 
BTMit 0.009 
(0.51) 
0.009 
(0.51) 
0.014 
(0.28) 
0.014 
(0.27) 
SIZEit 0.004 
(0.46) 
0.003 
(0.51) 
0.006 
(0.25) 
0.005 
(0.30) 
RETit 0.088 
(0.00) 
0.089 
(0.00) 
0.088 
(0.00) 
0.089 
(0.00) 
FFRt 0.003 
(0.72) 
0.003 
(0.73) 
0.003 
(0.75) 
0.002 
(0.76) 
     
R2 adjusted 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 
Number observations 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 
Pooled regression time-series with robust errors computed on double cluster (bank and year). Dependent 
variable Bonusit: total amount of bonus received over total compensation (for all Board members). 
TNIINIIit: total non-interest income over net interest income; TINII: trading income over net interest 
income; IBVCINII: investment banking and venture capital income over net interest income; DTAit: total 
debt deflated by bank’s total assets; DWWSFTAit: total debt without short-term wholesale funding over 
total assets; WSFTAit: short-term wholesale funding over total assets; NITAit: net income to total assets; 
OBSEXPTAit: off-balance sheet exposure to total assets; BTMit: book-to-market; SIZEit: logarithm of 
bank’s market value; RETit: annual bank’s return; FFRt: federal fund rate. All variables are measured in 
annual terms. Robust p-values in brackets. 
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Table 7. Estimation of bonus distinguishing the crisis period 
Variable M. I M. II M. III M. IV 
Constantit -0.857 
(0.00) 
-1.156 
(0.00) 
-0.963 
(0.00) 
-1.654 
(0.00) 
TNIINIIit 0.013 
(0.02) 
0.017 
(0.01)   
CDt*TNIINIIit -0.049 
(0.00) 
0.656 
(0.00)   
TINIIit   -0.006 (0.79) 
-0.006 
(0.79) 
CDt*TINIIit   -0.071 (0.20) 
0.183 
(0.01) 
IBVCNIIit   0.021 (0.00) 
0.026 
(0.00) 
CDt*IBVCNIIit   1.122 (0.00) 
0.960 
(0.00) 
DTAit 1.077 
(0.00)  
1.208 
(0.00)  
CDt*DTAit -0.143 
(0.00)  
-0.175 
(0.00)  
DWWSFTAit  1.356 (0.00)  
1.504 
(0.00) 
CDt*DWWSFTAit  -0.915 (0.00)  
-0.137 
(0.00) 
WSFTAit  1.400 (0.00)  
1.593 
(0.00) 
CDt*WSFTAit  -0.732 (0.00)  
-0.521 
(0.00) 
NITAit 1.807 
(0.06) 
2.399 
(0.01) 
2.006 
(0.06) 
2.457 
(0.01) 
OBSEXPTAit  1.237 
(0.03) 
1.099 
(0.07) 
1.330 
(0.01) 
1.240 
(0.02) 
BTMit 0.033 
(0.01) 
0.030 
(0.02) 
0.037 
(0.01) 
0.031 
(0.02) 
SIZEit 0.003 
(0.48) 
0.005 
(0.37) 
0.003 
(0.55) 
0.007 
(0.16) 
RETit 0.057 
(0.00) 
0.062 
(0.00) 
0.056 
(0.00) 
0.063 
(0.00) 
FFRt -0.006 
(0.19) 
-0.004 
(0.43) 
-0.006 
(0.16) 
-0.003 
(0.49) 
     
R2 adjusted 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.31 
Number observations 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 
Pooled regression time-series with robust errors computed on double cluster (bank and year). Dependent 
variable Bonusit: total amount of bonus received over total compensation (for all Board members). 
TNIINIIit: total non-interest income over net interest income; CDt: crisis dummy variable (1 if year equal or 
superior than 2007); CDt*TNIINIIit: interaction between CD and TNIINII; TINIIit: trading income over net 
interest income; CDt*TINIIit: interaction between CD and TINII; IBVCINIIit: investment banking and 
venture capital income over net interest income; CDt*IBVCINIIit: interaction between CD and IBVCINII; 
DTAit: total debt deflated by bank’s total assets; CDt*DTAit: interaction between CD and DTA; 
DWWSFTAit: total debt without short-term wholesale funding over total assets; CDt*DWWSFTAit: 
interaction between CD and DWWSFTA; WSFTAit: short-term wholesale funding over total assets; 
CDt*WSFTAit: interaction between CD and WSFTA; NITAit: net income to total assets; OBSEXPTAit: off-
balance sheet exposure to total assets; BTMit: book-to-market; SIZEit: logarithm of bank’s market value; 
RETit: annual bank’s return; FFRt: federal fund rate. All variables are measured in annual terms. Robust p-
values in brackets. 
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Table 8. Estimation of options exercised 
Variable M. I M. II M. III M. IV 
Constantit -0.860 
(0.02) 
-0.795 
(0.05) 
-0.819 
(0.07) 
-0.795 
(0.10) 
TNIINIIit -0.004 
(0.66) 
-0.005 
(0.60)   
TINIIit   0.100 (0.03) 
0.098 
(0.03) 
IBVCNIIit   -0.006 (0.58) 
-0.006 
(0.57) 
DTAit 0.739 
(0.05)  
0.706 
(0.12)  
DWWSFTAit  0.668 (0.10)  
0.680 
(0.16) 
WSFTAit  0.751 (0.04)  
0.710 
(0.12) 
NITAit 4.277 
(0.00) 
4.321 
(0.00) 
3.676 
(0.00) 
3.698 
(0.00) 
OBSEXPTAit  -0.933 
(0.11) 
-0.995 
(0.09) 
-1.408 
(0.01) 
-1.426 
(0.01) 
BTMit -0.040 
(0.22) 
-0.040 
(0.22) 
-0.041 
(0.20) 
-0.041 
(0.20) 
SIZEit 0.026 
(0.00) 
0.025 
(0.00) 
0.025 
(0.00) 
0.024 
(0.00) 
RETit -0.012 
(0.78) 
-0.011 
(0.80) 
-0.011 
(0.80) 
-0.010 
(0.81) 
FFRt -6.4E-4 
(0.94) 
-8.2E-4 
(0.92) 
4.5E-4 
(0.96) 
3.7E-4 
(0.96) 
     
R2 adjusted 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 
Number observations 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 
Pooled regression time-series with robust errors computed on double cluster (bank and year). Dependent 
variable Options exercisedit: value realized on options exercised over total compensation (for all Board 
members). TNIINIIit: total non-interest income over net interest income; TINII: trading income over net 
interest income; IBVCINII: investment banking and venture capital income over net interest income; 
DTAit: total debt deflated by bank’s total assets; DWWSFTAit: total debt without short-term wholesale 
funding over total assets; WSFTAit: short-term wholesale funding over total assets; NITAit: net income to 
total assets; OBSEXPTAit: off-balance sheet exposure to total assets; BTMit: book-to-market; SIZEit: 
logarithm of bank’s market value; RETit: annual bank’s return; FFRt: federal fund rate. All variables are 
measured in annual terms. Robust p-values in brackets. 
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Table 9. Estimation of options exercised distinguishing the crisis period 
Variable M. I M. II M. III M. IV 
Constantit -0.774 
(0.05) 
-0.780 
(0.06) 
-0.644 
(0.14) 
-0.771 
(0.12) 
TNIINIIit -0.004 
(0.67) 
-0.004 
(0.69)   
CDt*TNIINIIit -0.032 
(0.12) 
0.020 
(0.91)   
TINIIit   0.098 (0.04) 
0.097 
(0.03) 
CDt*TINIIit   -0.077 (0.54) 
0.052 
(0.68) 
IBVCNIIit   -0.009 (0.36) 
-0.008 
(0.49) 
CDt*IBVCNIIit   -0.433 (0.43) 
-0.451 
(0.43) 
DTAit 0.658 
(0.09)  
0.541 
(0.22)  
CDt*DTAit -0.026 
(0.47)  
-0.040 
(0.28)  
DWWSFTAit  0.652 (0.12)  
0.645 
(0.18) 
CDt*DWWSFTAit  -0.075 (0.74)  
-0.066 
(0.01) 
WSFTAit  0.725 (0.05)  
0.651 
(0.13) 
CDt*WSFTAit  -0.089 (0.63)  
-0.008 
(0.95) 
NITAit 3.944 
(0.01) 
4.079 
(0.00) 
3.380 
(0.01) 
3.478 
(0.01) 
OBSEXPTAit  -0.869 
(0.12) 
-0.940 
(0.09) 
-1.322 
(0.01) 
-1.325 
(0.01) 
BTMit -0.034 
(0.27) 
-0.035 
(0.26) 
-0.036 
(0.23) 
-0.038 
(0.23) 
SIZEit 0.026 
(0.00) 
0.026 
(0.00) 
0.024 
(0.00) 
0.026 
(0.00) 
RETit -0.020 
(0.66) 
-0.018 
(0.70) 
-0.002 
(0.82) 
-0.017 
(0.71) 
FFRt -0.003 
(0.65) 
-0.003 
(0.71) 
-0.002 
(0.82) 
-0.001 
(0.84) 
     
R2 adjusted 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 
Number observations 1,289 1,289 1,289 1,289 
Pooled regression time-series with robust errors computed on double cluster (bank and year). Dependent 
variable Options exercisedit: value realized on options exercised over total compensation (for all Board 
members). TNIINIIit: total non-interest income over net interest income; CDt: crisis dummy variable (1 if 
year equal or superior than 2007); CDt*TNIINIIit: interaction between CD and TNIINII; TINIIit: trading 
income over net interest income; CDt*TINIIit: interaction between CD and TINII; IBVCINIIit: investment 
banking and venture capital income over net interest income; CDt*IBVCINIIit: interaction between CD and 
IBVCINII; DTAit: total debt deflated by bank’s total assets; CDt*DTAit: interaction between CD and DTA; 
DWWSFTAit: total debt without short-term wholesale funding over total assets; CDt*DWWSFTAit: 
interaction between CD and DWWSFTA; WSFTAit: short-term wholesale funding over total assets; 
CDt*WSFTAit: interaction between CD and WSFTA; NITAit: net income to total assets; OBSEXPTAit: off-
balance sheet exposure to total assets; BTMit: book-to-market; SIZEit: logarithm of bank’s market value; 
RETit: annual bank’s return; FFRt: federal fund rate. All variables are measured in annual terms. Robust p-
values in brackets. 
 
